SOMALIA
PREPAREDNESS PLAN FOR FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISES

Federal Government of Somalia
Ministry of Finance

Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
Federal Republic of Somalia

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Somali National Bureau Of Statistics

Food Systems, Nutrition and Climate Change Council

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FOREWORD

I am glad that the Preparedness Plan for Food and Nutrition Security Crises is completed and now ready for publication. Recurrent climate disasters such as droughts and flooding shocks have weakened household resilience over time and increasingly drive food and nutrition security (FNS) crises, which are now the most pressing challenges facing our nation in terms of poverty alleviation and economic prosperity. Often, national and international investments in recovery and resilience-building interventions are reallocated to respond to emerging FNS crises to save lives, as alternative resources to draw upon for emergencies are not readily available and raising new funds typically takes a long time. This national operational Plan will provide, for the first time, a new framework for a timely and well-coordinated response to an extraordinary FNS crisis in the country.

The Plan will also support ongoing government efforts to improve our ability to monitor and recognize emerging food crises in time and enable an early response through contingency financing across humanitarian and development programs, as well as mobilizing additional financing through escalation to the global and regional support arrangements. More importantly, by facilitating the integration of disaster risk financing into our broader fiscal framework, the Plan will put us in a stronger position to mitigate the financial impact of disasters, which is a major impediment to delivering public services consistently across the country. This Plan will thus fundamentally help to reduce the painful economic and social burden of FNS crises on our population, their livelihoods, homes, and communities.

The Ministry of Finance is fully committed to supporting a successful implementation of the Plan across government and will adopt it as an integral policy instrument to enhance Somalia's fiscal resilience and financing, enabling early responses to an emerging crisis, alongside other ongoing supporting reforms. These include measures intended to raise domestic revenue, enhance public financial management and good governance, and manage public expenditure better.

I thank the government ministries, agencies, World Bank, and Somalia Crisis Recovery Project team for their valuable contributions to the development of this Plan.

Minister of Finance
Bihi Iman Egeh

Somalia, as we know, has long been characterized by significant humanitarian needs arising from the impacts of climate change. Climate shocks increasingly drive droughts, floods, cyclones, and heatwaves which often disrupt the lives of millions when they occur. Climate projections indicate that the situation may get worse. Therefore, greater preparedness is critical to mitigate the impact of future disasters. The Preparedness Plan for Food and Nutrition Security Crises is a major right step in that direction. This is a national operational plan that defines what constitutes a major food and nutrition security (FNS) crisis, explains how FNS crisis risks are actively monitored, and details step-by-step protocols, roles, and timelines for mobilizing early action and additional funding to respond to emerging and major FNS crises. More importantly, the Plan integrates these preparedness elements into a cohesive operational framework to support the systematic recognition of emerging FNS crises and to prompt timely joined-up action across government agencies and across humanitarian and development partners to mitigate the impact of such crises.

The Plan is government-owned and led; focuses on acute shocks that threaten to lead to a major FNS crisis; is anchored by rigorous, well vetted, and timely FNS data and analytics; details operational arrangements and responsibilities for monitoring and quickly identifying major FNS crises, convening technical programmatic leads across government, humanitarian, and development partners; and sets forth protocols for convening senior officials to collectively recognize a crisis and bridge operational and funding gaps through well-coordinated and holistic responses.

The Plan has been informed by extensive consultations between government ministries and humanitarian and development partners. Technical consultations were held from February 2022 to September 2023, with technical workshops held on January 26-28, 2023 and July 25-27, 2023, and subsequently with the relevant FMS ministries from August 30 to September 11, 2023. The government expresses its deep appreciation for the support and dedication of its FNS partners to develop and support the Plan.

The Plan has been formally endorsed by the government and Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development is committed to support its successful implementation. More specifically, the Ministry will integrate the Plan's operational arrangements into the new National Transformation Plan 2025–2029 to ensure that the Preparedness Plan is effectively implemented across government.

I thank government line ministries and agencies, as well as the World Bank for their support and input to help prepare the Plan.

Minister of Planning, Investment and Economic Development

Mohamud Abdirahman Sheikh Farah

PREAMBLE

When an extraordinary food and nutrition security (FNS) crisis emerges, speed and coordination save lives. The Somalia Preparedness Plan for Food and Nutrition Security Crises (the Preparedness Plan, or the Plan) is a national operational plan that provides the foundation for a timely and well-coordinated response to an extraordinary FNS crisis in the country. It is a clear and proactive plan of action for a harmonized response to FNS crises by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), federal member states (FMS), and humanitarian and development partners.

The Preparedness Plan is government-owned and -led and is based on evidence-based and time-bound decision-making processes. The Plan defines an extraordinary FNS crisis in Somalia; details how FNS crisis risks are monitored and reported; establishes protocols for convening officials at varying levels of authority and responsibility to decide whether to trigger the Plan; explains how programming and financing are mobilized across all partners if the Plan is triggered; and specifies how these working arrangements are maintained and enhanced over time. It empowers all parts of the Somalia FNS crisis response ecosystem to protect lives and livelihoods and deliver better value for money for limited resources.

The Plan has been informed by extensive consultations between government ministries and humanitarian and development partners. Technical consultations[1] were held from February 2022 to September 2023, with technical workshops held on January 26–28, 2023 and July 25–27, 2023, and subsequently with relevant FMS ministries from August 30 to September 11, 2023. The government expresses its deep appreciation for the support and dedication of its FNS partners to help develop and support the implementation of the Plan.

The Plan has been formally endorsed by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development (MOPIED), Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, Ministry of Fisheries and Blue Economy, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range, Somali Disaster Management Agency (SODMA), Somalia National Bureau of Statistics (SNBS), and the Food Systems, Nutrition and Climate Change Council (FSNCC).

The Plan was officially launched on December 4, 2023 with a wide group of stakeholders, including senior FGS and agency officials, and became operational on January 1, 2024.

Questions about the Plan can be directed to Abdi Adan Tawane (tawane.scrp@gmail.com).

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[1] See https://www.gafs.info/country-profiles/?state=Alert&country=SOM

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Federal Government of Somalia is grateful to its many partners for their participation in consultations and for supporting the development and implementation of the Preparedness Plan for Food and Nutrition Security Crises. These partners include:

DONORS

Somalia Donor Working Group

DEVELOPMENT ACTORS

UNITED NATIONS

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia (DSRSG/RC/HC)

HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS

OTHER PARTNERS

ACRONYMS

AFI	acute food insecurity
AMN	acute malnutrition
CPI	consumer price index
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	federal member states
FNS	food and nutrition security
FSNAU	Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
FSNCC	Food Systems, Nutrition and Climate Change Council
GAFS	Global Alliance for Food Security
IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
IDP	internally displaced people
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
JMR	Joint Monitoring Report
MOAI	Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation
MOECC	Ministry of Environment and Climate Change
MOEWR	Ministry of Energy and Water Resources
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOFBE	Ministry of Fisheries and Blue Economy
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOLFR	Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range
MOLSA	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
MOPIED	Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development
ND-GAIN	Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative
NDP	National Development Plan
NDVI	Normalized Difference Vegetation Index
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
SNBS	Somalia National Bureau of Statistics
SODMA	Somali Disaster Management Agency
SWALIM	Somalia Water and Land Information Management
UNHCR	United Nations Refugee Agency
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

1 Preparedness Plan objectives, priorities, and value addition

The Preparedness Plan for Food and Nutrition Security Crises is a nationally owned and led operational plan that unites all partners to anticipate and respond to extraordinary FNS crises in Somalia. An extraordinary FNS crisis is an urgent situation requiring a full range of partners working together to meet humanitarian, development, and peace objectives. However, existing coordination mechanisms in the Somali humanitarian and development sectors, including on FNS and food systems, have often been siloed. These arrangements have evolved naturally in line with varying mandates and funding streams in a fragile country context but have historically required limited, if any, leadership from government. There has never been a single forum for government to bring together all relevant stakeholders when they are most needed to respond to an FNS crisis. Nor has there been a dedicated process for the Somali government to systematically bring its needs to the attention of relevant global and regional partners[2] that could provide valuable early support to a national FNS crisis response.[3]

The Plan aims to overcome these systemic challenges by mobilizing more consistent, collective, and earlier responses to FNS crises. The Plan adds value by overcoming siloed coordination mechanisms across FGS, FMS, humanitarian, development, and donor partners, and by establishing protocols to convene these partners so that they can make timely joint decisions that promote a comprehensive response at scale. It seeks to mobilize all aspects of aid (holistic support) to achieve objectives that span the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. The Plan seeks to enable a collective anticipatory response to an FNS crisis while identifying where longer-term structural investments are needed to address the root causes of the crisis.

The Plan defines an extraordinary FNS crisis; explains how major risks are proactively monitored, officially reported, and disseminated on a regular basis; and details step-by-step protocols, roles, and timelines for convening officials across government and its FNS partners to mobilize funding and prompt early action on emerging FNS crises. The Plan is underpinned by the principle of Do No Harm[4] and is a living document that will be updated regularly. The Plan reflects up-to-date operational arrangements in Somalia and specifies areas that are supported by key FNS partners in the country. It also covers forward-looking efforts to strengthen the capacity of FGS and its FMS to lead and deliver all aspects of the Plan over time.

The Plan adheres to international standards for FNS crisis preparedness. It connects to a global mechanism—supported by the Global Alliance for Food Security (GAFS), the Global Network Against Food Crises, and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee—that convenes global and regional senior representatives across the international community to help mobilize additional support, where possible, to bolster national responses when the Plan is triggered. The Plan links to this global mechanism via the Global Food and Nutrition Security Dashboard.[5]

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[2] For instance, the UN system; international financial institutions and multilateral development banks; major donors; nongovernmental organizations; regional inter-governmental organizations; and other relevant fora such as the G7 and G20.

[3] The Somalia Humanitarian Response Plans have provided an important means for escalating urgent FNS needs at regional and global levels; however, these efforts are directed primarily to humanitarian-focused outlets versus being integrated with broader developmental communities, etc.

[4] Preparedness Plan partners recognize the need to prevent any potential exacerbation of conflict by factoring in risk mitigation measures and clear targeting criteria during the assessment and implementation of FNS crisis response and planning. Future iterations of the Preparedness Plan will seek to expand this understanding, including through consultation with conflict-affected populations, such as internally displaced persons and refugees.

[5] See https://www.gafs.info/

The Plan's objectives are aligned with Somalia's national FNS priorities as articulated in the National Development Plan[6] (NDP-9) and Somalia National Food Fortification Strategic Plan 2019–2024,[7] which stress the importance of strengthening the country's resilience to climate and market shocks that may lead to FNS crises. The Plan will support the achievement of several key priorities of NDP-9 by operationalizing and systematizing early warning and anticipatory FNS measures, directing humanitarian and development programs to alleviate FNS crises, and increasing the country's resilience to future FNS shocks. It will also support the implementation of the Somalia Nutrition Strategy, making nutritious diets more affordable, available, and accessible to Somalis. Improving nutrition is recognized as a critical dimension of poverty reduction as part of the country's debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and as encompassed by Somalia's Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.

2 Somalia's food and nutrition security context

Somalia is highly food insecure and vulnerable to climate and economic shocks. Since 1990, the country has been plagued by political instability fueled by interclan conflict after the collapse of central state institutions. During the last decade and a half, a terrorist insurgency that grew to control large swaths of rural areas in southern and central Somalia, weak governance at central and regional level, a changing climate, and low public and private investment have undermined[8] the recovery of local food production, the availability of food supplies, and nationwide reconstruction and development. These factors have resulted in famine or near famine being declared on at least four occasions since 1990 (in 1992, 2011, 2016–18 and 2022–23). Annex 1 outlines the key drivers of food insecurity, as well as their interplay and impact.

Since 2021, Somalia has ranked 178th out of 182 countries in terms of vulnerability to climate change on the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative country index.[9] It has experienced more than 30 major climate-related shocks since 1990, including 12 major droughts and 19 flooding events. Flooding, which is anticipated to increase in intensity and frequency, is a particularly significant threat in the most-farmed Shabelle and Juba riverine regions, while the southwest, central, northeast, and northwest regions, where livestock production is the main economic activity, are the most drought-prone parts of the country.

Somalia's high levels of household vulnerability and structural poverty—about 73 percent of the population was estimated[10] to be living below the international poverty line in 2023—have created deep food and nutrition insecurities. In any given year, a large proportion of the population lives in conditions classified as Phase 3 (Crisis) and Phase 4 (Emergency) in the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) Acute Food Insecurity scale. (The scale defines five phases of food insecurity: (1) Minimal/None, (2) Stressed, (3) Crisis, (4) Emergency, and (5) Catastrophe/Famine.)

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6   See https://mop.gov.so/national-development-plan/
7   See https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-national-food-fortification-strategic-plan-2019-2024
8   See https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0306919221000713
9   A country's ND-GAIN index score is composed of a vulnerability score and a readiness score. Vulnerability measures a country's exposure, sensitivity, and ability to adapt to the negative impacts of climate change. See https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/
10   See https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/bae48ff2fefc5a869546775b3f010735-0500062021/related/mpo-som.pdf

Acute shocks are grouped according to their likelihood of occurring and the potential severity of their impact on FNS in Somalia. The country's nutrition indicators, particularly for children under 5, point to severe challenges. In 2022, an estimated 1.5 million children under 5 (45 percent of the under-5 population) faced acute malnutrition, and nearly 400,000 were likely to be severely malnourished. The country's macroeconomic outlook suggests subdued growth and incomes in the near future. In 2023, the International Monetary Fund forecast[11] GDP growth at 2.8 percent, implying negative or stagnant per-capita growth due to high population growth (3 percent annually), with continued major risks such as drought, global commodity price volatility, internal security, and political instability.

Along with political instability, a series of severe droughts has been the major cause of massive internal displacement. By 2022, nearly 65 percent of the 1.8 million internally displaced people (IDP) had left their homes on account of drought. This mass displacement of rural dwellers seeking food and basic services in urban and peri-urban areas has further contributed to chronic poverty and vulnerability. IDPs also have dwindling prospects of returning to their original productive activities or finding stable work in cities or towns. Large sections of the population continue to be affected by ongoing conflict and general insecurity, which also drive widespread displacement. Persistent conflict and violence further hinder access to already scarce resources and insufficient basic services, leaving nearly half the population[12]—over 8.7 million people—dependent on humanitarian aid to survive.

As a result of drought, political insecurity, a limited number of service providers, and the inability of communities to maintain local water infrastructure, only 55–60 percent[13] of the population has access to safe water. Access is further impeded by the price of water and the large distances people must travel to collect it. Furthermore, the insufficient number of groundwater pumping stations are not adequately maintained to provide a safe supply of water to meet the needs of the growing population. It is estimated that 24 percent of strategic water points are closed—dried up, overused, or destroyed—while much rainwater infrastructure is without water or is inoperative. Limited access to safe water and to adequate sanitation and hygiene services often contribute to outbreaks of cholera, measles, and acute watery diarrhea, which are among the direct causes of malnutrition in Somalia.

Due to low adaptation capacity in Somalia, climate change has severely affected livestock and crop productivity. Recurring droughts and floods have led to the loss of one third or more of livestock and crops in the worst-affected areas over the past decade. Livestock productivity is also negatively impacted by severe environmental degradation[14] driven by overgrazing and illicit land enclosures in the historically open pasture rangelands in some regions of Somalia. As a result, the availability of locally produced food has declined sharply. In a context of unstable global food supply systems, the country has become increasingly dependent on food imports in recent years—primarily financed by remittances from the Somali diaspora.

Structurally low productivity in the domestic crop and livestock sectors, very high dependency on food imports, and ongoing conflict and violence will continue to undermine Somalia's efforts to alleviate its widespread poverty and food and nutrition insecurity. Given that domestic and external funding are insufficient to address Somalia's structural poverty and food and nutrition insecurity, the country requires a major increase in resilience-strengthening and development programs. This Plan is designed to activate the support of existing humanitarian and development programs and additional financing sources to mitigate the impacts of emerging and future FNS emergencies and famine situations in Somalia.

11 See https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/05/19/pr23164-somalia-imf-executive-board-concludes-review-of-the-extended-credit-facility-for-somalia
12 See https://population.un.org/wpp/
13 See https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1063/ge/6343#page-title
14 See https://www.eld-initiative.org/fileadmin/Regreening_Africa_publications/ELD_somalia_report.pdf

3 Defining "an extraordinary food and nutrition security crisis"

To be effective, the Plan requires a clear and specific definition of "an extraordinary food and nutrition security crisis". Over the last decade and a half, extraordinary FNS crises in Somalia have mainly been caused by climate-related factors, such as severe droughts, floods, and infestations of desert locusts, with their impact exacerbated by international supply disruptions linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ukraine war, and persistent internal insecurity. Somalia also remains vulnerable to cholera and malaria, both of which affect nutrition outcomes.

The Somalia Preparedness Plan seeks to facilitate the quick identification of and response to extraordinary FNS crises. This requires scaled-up responses by FGS, FMS, and humanitarian, development, and donor partners. The Plan distinguishes between ongoing and heightened chronic FNS conditions—which can be best addressed with improved security and increased investments in long-term solutions—and moments when the country faces major shocks and 'tipping points' that can significantly exacerbate chronic conditions and push people into more extreme states of acute food and nutrition insecurity. Minimizing the severity of such shocks is especially important for preventing further setbacks in long-term development goals. By enabling FGS and its partners to respond to emerging FNS crises earlier and in a more coordinated fashion, the Preparedness Plan is expected to reduce the country's vulnerability to major shocks and help support the transition to greater resilience-building interventions over time.

The Plan should be triggered if certain parameters are met. These parameters are critical for ensuring that advocacy at country, regional, and global levels and additional resource mobilization, where possible, are reserved for the most serious risks. The parameters are intended to prompt recognition of an emerging and extraordinary FNS crisis. There should be general consensus among FGS and humanitarian, development, and peace partners that the following criteria have been met:

1. **An acute shock(s) has occurred**: Somalia is facing a clearly recognizable and distinct acute shock (or multiple acute shocks) that is highly likely to exacerbate existing chronic FNS conditions.

2. **A minimum level of FNS severity has been or is expected to be met**: General severity thresholds have been breached or are projected to be breached (e.g., a large number of households are or are expected to transition from IPC Phase 3 to Phase 4 or Phase 5 based on data provided by relevant sources, such as members of the Risk team).

3. **FNS conditions are at risk of significantly worsening**: There is a significant risk that, without further scaled-up action, the shock will increase the number of people experiencing acute food and nutrition insecurity—that is, IPC Phase 3 or worse.

In addition to these general parameters, the Plan utilizes triggerable events unique to Somalia that correspond with past FNS crises. Decision-makers can trigger the Plan based on the general parameters, or these events, or a combination of the two. Triggerable events for Somalia may be associated with one or more of the following acute shocks:

1. Two consecutive failed rains accompanied by a forecasted or expected third failed rain, defined as a seasonal (Gu or Deyr) rainfall of less than 50 percent of average precipitations across two or more territories in FMS.[15]

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15   An indicator for rainfall failure is the percentage decrease below the average of long-term mean (monthly) rainfall based on Somalia Water and Land Information Management (SWALIM) monitoring.

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2. A major flooding event affecting two or more territories in FMS, resulting in crop and livestock losses of more than 50 percent of average seasonal aggregate agricultural output.[16]

3. A major international and/or local conflict affecting food availability and/or access across two or more FMSs for more than a month, resulting in a significant increase in food prices.[17]

4. A disease outbreak (e.g., of cholera or malaria) expected to exceed emergency thresholds linked to potentially increasing malnutrition rates among children under 5. While parts of Somalia are chronically above 10 percent global acute malnutrition rates, the shock is associated with a malnutrition rate of more than 20 percent among children under 5.

Meeting the parameters or specific triggerable events does not require the declaration of famine or a state of emergency, although such a declaration could be needed at a later point. Instead, triggering the Plan is a proactive way for FGS and its partners to quickly identify when extraordinary FNS crisis risks are emerging and to act to limit the potential impacts on lives and livelihoods, especially of the poorest.

Based on historical experience, the Plan envisages that crises meeting the parameters and thresholds outlined above should correspond with a one-in-three-year (or more) event. For example, major droughts in the last two decades occurred in 2005/06, 2011/12, 2016/17, and 2022. The Plan should only be triggered in a special situation supported by data-driven and evidence-based decision-making; it should not be triggered as a means to bolster underfunded activities that address chronic conditions in the country.

4 Operational arrangements

Operational arrangements center on the Preparedness Plan's triggering cycle. Under the leadership of FGS, the Plan and the associated triggering cycle is supported by three teams:

1. **Risk Team**. This team comprises data specialists led by the Somalia National Bureau of Statistics (SNBS) in collaboration with the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) and Somalia Water and Land Information Management (SWALIM). They are responsible for monitoring and analyzing food and nutrition security data and making preliminary assessments (pre-assessments) on whether the definition of an extraordinary crisis may be approximated based on new risk reporting.

2. **Programming Team**. This team is led by the Somalia Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIED) and includes programmatic leads across government ministries and humanitarian, development, and donor partners. It is responsible for confirming the pre-assessment by the Risk Team and deciding when conditions warrant the attention of the Senior Team.

3. **Senior Team**. This team consists of senior institutional representatives across government ministries and humanitarian, development, and bilateral partners. The team is convened when the Programming and Risk Teams determine that the Plan may need to be triggered. The Senior Team is led by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), the decision-making body responsible for formally triggering the Plan.

16 An indicator for flooding is multiple breaches of critical river levels leading to major flooding across two or more FMSs based on SWALIM flood monitoring data.
17 An indicator for this is an increase of 25 percent or more in the price of water and at least two main staple foods, including meat, milk, vegetables, oils, rice, pasta, wheat flour, maize, sorghum, sesame, and cowpeas.

The triggering cycle begins when new and official FNS risk reports are produced by the Risk Team, which issues a pre-assessment as to whether or not the definition of a crisis has been met or is expected to be met based on the evidence included in the risk report. A meeting is then held with the Programming Team to review the report and pre-assessment and to decide whether the pre-assessment should be confirmed or amended. If the Programming Team finds that an extraordinary FNS crisis may be emerging, the Senior Team is promptly convened to be briefed on the situation and to be presented with options for mobilizing a scaled-up response. The OPM, as Chair of the Senior Team, decides whether or not to formally trigger the Plan, thereby calling on all partners to scale up support, where possible. The triggering cycle follows an evidence-based and time-bound process. The whole process—from initial dissemination of the new FNS report by the Risk Team through convening the Programming Team and developing the crisis preparedness escalation package to convening the Senior Team—should occur within one month. An overview of these arrangements is presented in Figure 1; details concerning specific step-by-step protocols, roles, and timelines for each team are included in subsequent sections.

Government leadership and ownership of the Preparedness Plan is essential for it to be effective and sustainable over the long term. Support across the whole of government is also important for ensuring that institutional and human capacities are strengthened to respond to future FNS crises in Somalia—critical for achieving longer-term development objectives and improving national financial planning.

Given the ongoing conflict in Somalia and its political fragility, exceptional conditions may arise that prevent the government from leading and implementing the Plan. In such exceptional scenarios, implementation of the Plan's operational arrangements will be led temporarily by the Office of the United Nations Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General or other suitable high-level international and multistakeholder office in close coordination with the country's FNS partners across the humanitarian, development, donor, and peace communities until FGS can resume its duties.

FIGURE 1: OVERALL SCHEMATIC

RECURRING FNS CRISIS RISK MONITORING AND ESCALATION

TRIGGERING THE PLAN

No escalation

Escalation

Plan not triggered

Plan triggered

A major FNS shock occurs or is projected to occur

Risk Team (SNBS, FSNAU, and SWALIM) recognizes risk in official FNS risk reporting and issues pre-assessment on whether the definition of an extraordinary crisis may be approximated

Programming Team (MOPIED; technical line ministries; and development, humanitarian, and donor partners, in consultation with the Risk Team) reviews/confirms pre-assessment and decides on escalation. If triggering may be warranted, team develops a crisis preparedness escalation package identifying programming responses and needs across partners for scaling up

Senior Team (OPM, technical line ministers, Chair of FSNCC, UNRC/HC, World Bank Country Manager, donor representatives) decides whether to trigger the Plan and agrees on subsequent actions (e.g., issue statement, mobilize contingency resources)

Global/Reg Support convened jointly by IASC, GAFS, and GNAFC upon the triggering of a Plan to raise awareness and bolster national responses

4a. Risk Team – Operational arrangements for monitoring, reporting, and identifying extraordinary FNS crises in Somalia

The SNBS is responsible for leading Somalia's official process for monitoring and reporting FNS crisis risks and drivers and is supported by FSNAU and SWALIM, alongside other FNS partners as needed.

Given that FNS crisis risks are complex and multidimensional, several indicators must be tracked at any time to properly monitor key risks that could affect food and nutrition security availability, access, utilization, and stability. This includes, for instance, monitoring rainfall, vegetation (via the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI)), river levels, crop and livestock production levels, food imports, food markets (imported and domestic food prices), nutrition, conflict, displacement, and remittances.[18]

The FGS has begun to collect some FNS-related data as well as other basic economic and social data, and is currently partnering with FSNAU, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Bank to further build its FNS crisis-risk-monitoring capacity. However, its current capacity to collect field data and lead all aspects of FNS reporting is limited. Until it is ready to fully manage these processes, FGS will therefore continue to partner closely with its main FNS partners to facilitate appropriate data collection and analysis. An FGS needs assessment and outline of specific steps to be taken to support FGS in leading the collection and related reporting is contained in Annex 2.

Somalia's primary FNS reporting currently centers around two recurring and complementary reports by FSNAU, covering the two main rain and growing seasons (Gu and Deyr). SNBS is developing an additional, lighter-touch FNS risk report known as the Joint Monitoring Report (JMR). The JMR seeks to complement the two existing FSNAU reporting cycles, is IPC-compatible, and expands on the FSNAU Somalia Early Warning Early Action Dashboard.[19] The JMR uses innovative, pioneering data-driven approaches, including machine learning and artificial intelligence, to identify major FNS crisis risks and inform decision-making. The JMR enhances early crisis warnings and distinguishes between heightened chronic FNS conditions and acute moments when Somalia faces major and extraordinary shocks and 'tipping points' that can exacerbate chronic conditions and push more people into extreme states of acute food insecurity. The JMR prioritizes simplicity over complexity, adheres to robust data standards and quality checks, and ensures results are accurate, transparent, and replicable. It provides a foundation for further expansion over time, particularly as additional FNS data and indicators become available. In its current form—and by utilizing only six risk indicators—JMR statistical modeling is able to capture approximately 80 percent of the major historical spikes in IPC 4 or worse conditions, providing a high level of accuracy and precision. The JMR supporting teams seek to maximize links with existing FNS analytical teams such as the IPC Technical Working Group. SNBS also works closely with all of these partners to standardize relevant FNS-related data methodologies, timing, and collection as part of its consolidated and recurring FNS reports. Additional technical details about each report are provided in Box 1.

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[18] Most of these indicators are monitored directly or indirectly by FSNAU and SWALIM, two Food and Agriculture Organization-managed and donor-supported agencies in the process of being fully transferred to the FGS (FSNAU to NBS and SWALIM to MOECC, based on a memorandum of understanding signed in September 2021 between the FAO and MOPIED and based on subsequent directives issued by OPM). Food prices in major markets across the country are also monitored regularly by the World Food Programme and Famine Early Warning Systems Network. NBS monitors consumer prices in Mogadishu. Food imports data are available from the four main port authorities in the country, although data are collected only for Mogadishu, while imports for the other three ports (Bossaso, Kismayo, and Berbera) are based on estimates. The Central Bank of Somalia tracks monthly remittance flows based on reports from hawala companies. Other indicators are also monitored across various FGS ministries (e.g. MOAI, MOLFR, MOFBE, MOEWR, MOH, SODMA, and FMS) and FNS partners (based on their respective mandates and operational mandates).

[19] See https://fsnau.org/special-content/fsnau-early-warning-early-action-dashboard

OFFICIAL SOMALIA FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISK MONITORING REPORTS

FSNAU Somalia Post-Gu[20] *and Post-Deyr*[21] *Food Security and Nutrition Outcomes and Projections*
FSNAU will continue to publish two comprehensive FNS updates per year corresponding with Somalia's rainy seasons. The Gu season runs from April to June, with FSNAU publishing its report in September, while the Deyr season runs from October to December, with FSNAU publishing its report the following February.

The update process typically begins during the respective rainy season and takes about five months to complete, including dissemination to stakeholders. The process entails regional planning workshops/training; data collection (countrywide field and satellite-based surveys); primary data estimates; and IPC analyses and technical vetting primarily by FSNAU, SWALIM, and Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) experts; dedicated briefings to senior government officials, heads of UN agencies, and their technical officers; and publication and dissemination to all relevant stakeholders. Participants supporting the update process include government institutions (from FGS and FMS), non-governmental organizations, local universities, technical partners (such as FEWS NET, REACH, IPC Global Support Unit), UN agencies (such as FAO, including WFP and UNICEF), and the food security, nutrition, and protection clusters.

STEP	ACTIVITY	ROLES	TIMELINE (DAYS)
1	[Food Security and Nutrition Teams] • Review and endorse integrated nutrition, mortality, and food security assessment plan (survey protocols)	**Lead** FSNAU **Contributing** FSNAU technical partners[22]	Days 0–10
2	[Nutrition Team] • Finalization of tools and sampling for integrated nutrition surveys • Integrated IDPs/urban survey training • IDPs/urban survey field work/data collection • IDPs/urban survey data entry, cleaning, and preliminary analysis • Integrated rural survey training • Rural integrated survey field work/data collection • Rural survey data entry, cleaning, and preliminary analysis • Technical vetting of nutrition survey results	**Lead** FSNAU **Contributing** FSNAU technical partners	Days 10–90

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[20] For example, the 2022 report, published in September 2022. See https://fsnau.org/downloads/Somalia-2022-Post-Gu-Seasonal-Assessment-Key-Findings-Final-12-Sep-2022.pdf

[21] For example, the 2022 report, published in February 2023. See https://fsnau.org/downloads/Somalia-2022-Post-Deyr-Seasonal-Food-Security-and-Nutrition-Assessment-Findings-28-Feb-2023.pdf

[22] FSNAU is managed by FAO and is comprised of dedicated technical partners that include government ministries, FEWS NET, WFP, WHO, SWALIM, UNICEF, JRC, and UNHCR. Additionally, FSNAU is supported by several resource partners (e.g., USAID, UKAID, the European Union, Sweden, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and the Republic of Slovenia).

STEP	ACTIVITY	ROLES	TIMELINE (DAYS)
2 *cont.*	[Food Security Team] • Rapid urban and IDP food security assessment • Rural preliminary food security assessment • Travel for regional planning meetings • Rural comprehensive food security assessment regional planning meetings in Hargeisa, Garowe, Dhuusamareeb, Beledweyne, Mogadishu, Baidoa, Doolow, and Kismayo • Rural comprehensive food security assessment (field work/data collection) • Rural comprehensive food security assessment data entry and preliminary analysis (at own duty station) [Food Security and Nutrition Teams] • Pre-identification and confirmation of IPC analyses participants • Sending out invitation to confirmed list of IPC analyses participants • IPC acute food insecurity (AFI) and IPC acute malnutrition (AMN) refresher training (concurrent, virtual) for confirmed IPC analyses participants • Training (virtual) for confirmed IPC analyses participants	**Lead** FSNAU **Contributing** FSNAU technical partners	Days 10–90
3	[Food Security and Nutrition Teams] • Travel to the IPC analyses preparatory workshops • IPC analyses preparatory workshops (concurrently in Hargeisa, Garowe, and Mogadishu) – data compilation and preparation for AFI and AMN analyses (assessment teams only) • Travel to IPC AFI and AMN analyses workshops	**Lead** FSNAU **Contributing** FSNAU technical partners	Days 90–100
4	AFI and AMN Analyses Workshops (concurrently in Hargeisa, Garowe, and Mogadishu) [Food Security Team] • Developing AFI projection assumptions • AFI working group sessions • Technical vetting of AFI analyses (including current and projection maps and figures) [Nutrition Team] • Developing AMN projection assumptions • AMN working group sessions • Technical vetting of AMN analyses (including current and projection maps and burden estimates)	**Lead** FSNAU **Contributing** FSNAU technical partners	Days 100–130

STEP	ACTIVITY	ROLES	TIMELINE (DAYS)
4 *cont.*	[Food Security and Nutrition Teams] • Sector presentations: climate, agriculture, livestock, markets, civil insecurity, nutrition, and humanitarian assistance: food security; nutrition; health; and water, sanitation, and hygiene • Presentation of outcome indicators (rural, urban, and IDPs) • Food security and nutrition linkages analyses • Final technical vetting (joint session for AFI and AMN Teams) and self-assessment • Travel back to duty stations • Finalization of multi-partner IPC briefing presentations	**Lead** FSNAU **Contributing** FSNAU technical partners	Days 100–130
5	• Briefings for FGS line ministries (Mogadishu); Preparedness Plan Programming Team; United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator and heads of humanitarian agencies • Briefing for Humanitarian Donors Group and Humanitarian Country Team • Briefing for federal member states and Somaliland and for all stakeholders in Mogadishu • Preparation, finalization, and launch of the multi-partner IPC communication report (Mogadishu)	**Lead** FSNAU **Contributing** FSNAU technical partners	Days 130–135

These reports include a number of survey-based and geospatial indicators covering current and projected FNS outcomes based on:

i. food availability (rainfall/temperature performance and forecasts and their estimated impacts on water availability, agricultural crops, pasture, livestock production, and livelihood coping) and other drivers such as pest infestation or animal diseases;

ii. food access (market price trends in both urban and rural settlements; trends in remittances; food consumption score; household diet diversity score; household hunger score; reduced coping strategies);[23]

iii. food stability (population movement/displacement and insecurity); and

iv. food utilization and health status (nutrition outcomes such as global AMN and severe AMN and projections; mortality among children and adults; mid-upper arm circumference assessments; morbidity; measles vaccination among children; acute watery diarrhea; measles cases).

These reports also include an overview of the status of humanitarian food/cash assistance and key messages and recommendations for various stakeholders.

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23 Examples of coping strategies include sale of assets, borrowing, food rationing, and reallocation of non-food household expenditure (e.g., schooling) to food. These are indicators of household-level food insecurity and vulnerability.

SNBS Semi-annual Food and Nutrition Security Joint Monitoring Reports[24]

A light-touch and statistically based FNS JMR is produced by SNBS every six months (in May/Jun and Nov/Dec) to complement the FSNAU post-Gu and post-Deyr reports. The JMR tracks and consolidates key quantitative and qualitative FNS indicators. It is based on the latest available data from FSNAU, the Humanitarian Data Exchange,[25] SWALIM, FGS ministries, FMS, and other partners that produce robust data on a monthly or weekly basis on FNS indicators such as rainfall, vegetation, displacement, food prices, food imports, remittances, and livestock exports.

The JMR uses an innovative statistical approach to assess high-quality and -frequency FNS risk indicators against historic crisis conditions in the country. The statistical modelling defines two levels of FNS risk threshold.

1. **Heightened risk alerts** highlight districts where there has been a significant deterioration in a specific FNS risk indicator and identify districts where households are likely to be impacted by a deteriorating FNS situation, requiring further monitoring. These alerts contribute to the overall FNS outlook and narrative of the JMR.

2. **Critical risk alerts** highlight districts where there has been a critical deterioration in a specific FNS risk indicator and identify districts where households are very likely to be impacted by a deteriorating FNS situation and that should be regarded as high priority.

Annex 3 shows select JMR indicators and statistical thresholds relating to alerts.

The results from the JMR's statistical model are analyzed alongside qualitative information to support the preparation of the report. By developing a heightened/critical risk alert system and applying pre-determined and standardized thresholds, it is possible to consistently determine whether FNS conditions are improving, static, or worsening over time. An increase in the number of heightened/critical risk alerts suggests a potential deterioration in FNS at the household level, corresponding with worsening IPC phases. The statistical methodology underpinning the JMR is supported by extensive peer review and academic literature.[26]

STEP	ACTIVITY	ROLES	TIMELINE (DAYS)
1	JMR data are gathered from the Risk Team. This includes utilizing automated application programming interfaces, where possible, and manual data submission by Risk Team members. The Risk Team is given two days to provide their manual inputs. Data are then consolidated as part of the Risk Team Airtable system and related JMR dashboard. This information helps identify key districts to highlight in the JMR analysis.	**Lead** SNBS **Contributing** Risk Team	Days 0–2
2	SNBS, with support from the Risk Team, drafts the JMR (V1), which includes quantitative and qualitative analyses. SNBS then emails the Risk Team a link to an online shared version of the JMR (V1) to streamline the revision process.	**Lead** SNBS **Contributing** Risk Team	Days 2–5

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24 Somalia is developing its own JMR. A similar effort can be seen in the Yemen Joint Monitoring Report.

25 See https://data.humdata.org/

26 See, for example, Penson, Lomme, Carmichael, Manni, Shrestha, Andrée. 2024. "A Data-Driven Approach for Early Detection of Food Insecurity in Yemen's Humanitarian Crisis". https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099709505092462162/idu1fd335ca917518148461a5b1154ba368027ff

STEP	ACTIVITY	ROLES	TIMELINE (DAYS)
3	The Risk Team reviews JMR (V1) and provides edits and additions as needed in the online shared version. At this point, the Risk Team will already consider any major revisions in content and language.	Risk Team	Days 5–10
4	SNBS takes the draft JMR offline and incorporates edits and additions. Any major substantive questions will be shared with specific Risk Team members for clarification, if needed. The updated draft is sent to the SNBS editing team (to edit for content and language). A JMR (V2) is produced, reflecting all inputs received from the Risk Team. SNBS then sends an email with a link to a shared version of the JMR (V2) to the contributing institutions (including members from the Risk Team and their respective legal and senior counterparts).	**Lead** SNBS **Contributing** Risk Team	Days 10–15
5	Risk Team provides final inputs and clearance of JMR (V2) by their respective legal and senior counterparts, as needed.	**Lead** Risk Team (including clearance from legal and senior counterparts, as needed)	Days 15–17
6	SNBS receives clearance and incorporates changes submitted by contributing institutions, and shares the updated JMR (V3) with the SNBS design team. The design team finalizes the JMR (V3), and SNBS circulates the final version with the draft pre-assessment email to the Risk Team.	**Lead** SNBS	Days 17–19
7	SNBS publicly circulates the final JMR alongside the pre-assessment email to the designated distribution list. Recipients include the Risk Team's communications counterparts, who profile the JMR on social media and other channels once the JMR has been distributed and links have been shared by SNBS and the Risk Team.	**Lead** SNBS **Contributing** Communications Teams	Day 20

The triggering process for the Preparedness Plan begins when a new FNS crisis risk monitoring report is published. Under the Plan, a pre-assessment will be issued on publication of such a report by FSNAU or SNBS to determine whether or not an extraordinary FNS crisis—as defined by the Plan—may be emerging. Such an assessment is based on integrated analysis (both quantitative and qualitative data) of factors including food production, security, livelihoods, and the country's nutrition situation. Additionally, the pre-assessment is confirmed by SNBS, FSNAU,

and SWALIM, and in consultation with technical FNS partners. SNBS leads the pre-assessment process with the Risk Team and promptly sends the new report and pre-assessment to MOPIED. SNBS is also responsible for developing a short presentation, in close consultation with the Risk Team, to be presented to the Programming Team, highlighting the main emerging FNS crisis risks and the rationale for the pre-assessment. Table 1 shows the protocols that the Risk Team leads as part of the Preparedness Plan triggering process, with Figure 2 summarizing these protocols.

FIGURE 2: RISK TEAM PROTOCOLS

Risk Team (SNBS, FSNAU, SWALIM, and FNS risk monitoring partners) publishes new official FNS risk report (every three months)

SNBS convenes pre-assessment meeting with Risk Team to discuss findings and conduct pre-assessment

SNBS informs MOPIED of pre-assessment outcome through email including copy of new FNS report, key messages, and pre-assessment outcome

SNBS and Risk Team develop short presentation for Programming Team, highlighting main FNS crisis risks and pre-assessment rationale

TABLE 1: RISK TEAM PROTOCOLS AS PART OF THE PREPAREDNESS PLAN TRIGGERING PROCESS

STEPS	RESPONSIBLE	DUE
1. New official FNS risk report is published by Risk Team; Risk Team technical members request SNBS Director-General to convene Preparedness Plan pre-assessment meeting with Risk Team. • Official FNS risk reports are produced by the Risk Team every three months: February (FSNAU post-Deyr), May/June (JMR), September (FSNAU post-Gu), and November/December (JMR).	**Lead** SNBS **Contributing** Risk Team: FSNAU, SWALIM, and other FNS partners (as relevant)	Day 0
2. SNBS convenes Preparedness Plan pre-assessment meeting with Risk Team: • Risk Team discusses findings of new report • Risk Team conducts pre-assessment to determine if evidence from report approximates definition of an FNS crisis as specified in the Plan.	**Lead** Risk Team (SNBS chairs)	Day 2
3. Following the pre-assessment meeting with the Risk Team, SNBS informs MOPIED of the pre-assessment outcome. • SNBS sends MOPIED an email to send to the Programming Team. The email includes: a copy of the new FNS report; key messages from the report; and the final Preparedness Plan pre-assessment outcome.	**Lead** SNBS	Day 3
4. SNBS develops a short presentation, in close consultation with the Risk Team, to be presented to the Programming Team, highlighting the main emerging FNS crisis risks and the rationale for the pre-assessment.	**Lead** SNBS, in consultation with Risk Team	Ahead of Programming Team meeting

4b. Programming Team – Operational arrangements for convening and decision-making to escalate emerging FNS crises

MOPIED is responsible for leading the convening and decision-making processes associated with the Programming Team, such as arranging meeting logistics and chairing meetings. The Programming Team comprises designated FNS programmatic leads (or focal points) across FGS and FMS, donors, UN agencies and the multilateral system, international financial institutions, and civil society organizations (e.g., the Somalia NGO Consortium). These programmatic leads are generally responsible for overseeing the implementation of FNS-related programming for their respective institutions. A primary focal point as well as an alternative focal point are nominated by their respective agencies; a record of focal points is maintained by MOPIED.

Technical line ministries/agencies serve as lead subject matter specialists for this group, corresponding with their respective mandates and fields of competence. These technical leads have both subject matter expertise and lead programming responsibilities across various areas of FNS.

The Programming Team meets around the publication of new and official FNS crisis risk reports and on an ad hoc basis. Once SNBS issues updated FNS risk reports and the pre-assessment, MOPIED promptly disseminates this information to the Programming Team and to the Global FNS Dashboard. MOPIED then convenes the Programming Team within 10 business days to decide whether there is a need to escalate emerging FNS conditions in the country to the Senior Team.

In the event that the Programming Team decides that an extraordinary FNS crisis may be emerging and requests the convening of the Senior Team, MOPIED—in close consultation with technical line ministries/agencies—will request members of the Programming Team to identify specific operational priorities and activities that can be scaled up across humanitarian and development partners and provide an analysis of the financing gap needed to address the emerging crisis conditions. Further details on the modalities for scaling up activities and financing is provided in Section 5. Given the critical importance of mobilizing a rapid and early response, this analysis will be finalized within 10 business days of the decision taken by the Programming Team, with members of the Programming Team working closely together to provide sufficient information to justify the estimated costs and priorities of the response in terms of program activities, scale, and geographic coverage. The response should represent a holistic support approach, covering the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. Operational priorities should demonstrate a good balance between addressing immediate needs and building resilience to future shocks as part of the response.

Beyond contributing to the decision-making process to trigger the Preparedness Plan, the Programming Team also works together to enhance FNS crisis preparedness in the country and helps periodically update the Plan's operational arrangements. Areas of collaboration include:

- Sharing relevant FNS crisis response information and updates;

- Facilitating enhanced coordination of FNS-related crisis responses across partners, including identifying and mapping interventions;

- Supporting the tracking and mobilization of relevant contingency financing resources and FNS program activities;

- Facilitating and strengthening partnerships among FNS sector members to enhance the impact of related interventions;

- Sharing, learning from, and building on best practices in FNS crisis prevention, preparedness, and response;

- Supporting the strengthening of national and local FNS crisis responses;

- Informing and leveraging humanitarian and developmental policies by sharing data systematically, promoting cooperation, and pre-emptively identifying potential response options;

- Updating the Plan's operational arrangements, including dedicated focal points, on a regular (minimum yearly) basis; and

- Integrating pertinent updates into the Plan and conducting comprehensive performance evaluations of its operational arrangements every three years.

Figure 3 summarizes the protocols that the Programming Team leads as part of the Preparedness Plan triggering process, while Table 2 shows these in more detail.

FIGURE 3: PROGRAMMING TEAM PROTOCOLS

No escalation — Meeting summary published

Escalation

MOPIED shares Risk Team outputs and calls meeting

MOPIED convenes preparatory meeting with technical line ministries and Risk Team ahead of Programming Team meeting

Programming Team (led by MOPIED and including technical line ministries and FNS programming leads from UN, humanitarian, development, and donor partners) and Risk Team meet to discuss report and confirm/ amend pre-assessment outcome by 2/3 vote

MOPIED (in consultation with technical line ministries and Programming Team) leads development of crisis preparedness escalation package* and sends to Senior Team

Senior Team (OPM, technical line ministers, Chair of FSNCC, UNRC/HC, World Bank Country Manager, donor partners) convened

WITHIN 10 BUSINESS DAYS | WITHIN 10 BUSINESS DAYS | WITHIN 10 BUSINESS DAYS

*Package includes: i) FNS report summary and escalation rationale; ii) copies of report and presentation; (iii) proposed program adjustments and estimate of additional resources needed

STEPS	RESPONSIBLE	DUE
1. Upon receiving the updated and official FNS crisis risk monitoring report and pre-assessment from SNBS, MOPIED shares the report, pre-assessment, and meeting agenda (including calendar invitation and logistics) with the Programming Team and calls for a meeting to be held within 10 business days.	**Lead** MOPIED	Day 0-2
2. MOPIED convenes Programming Team preparatory meeting, including SNBS, FSNAU, SWALIM, and technical line ministries/ agencies. Run of show, key discussion topics, and other relevant issues are discussed.	**Lead** MOPIED **Contributing** SNBS, FSNAU, SWALIM, technical line ministries/agencies	Day 5

3. MOPIED convenes the meeting of Programming and Risk Teams.
 • MOPIED opens meeting and conducts roll call
 • The Risk Team (SNBS, FSNAU, SWALIM) presents findings from the official risk report, as well as reflections and rationale for the pre-assessment outcome.
 • The Programming Team asks questions about the risk report and discusses current and projected FNS crisis risks with the Risk Team. Technical line ministries will facilitate discussion on the severity of the conditions captured in the report; supplementary perspectives from operations on the ground; considerations among partners regarding the capacity of existing operations to address emerging needs; preliminary discussion on current financing and operational gaps; and other relevant matters.
 • The Programming Team decides whether to confirm or amend the pre-assessment.
 • Based on a super-majority vote[27] (2/3 of voting members, or 66 percent, agreeing), the Programming Team decides whether or not to alert the Senior Team to the emerging FNS crisis conditions.
 • To escalate, members should ensure that the following criteria have been met:
    i. All the general FNS crisis definition parameters and/ or specific trigger event threshold(s) defined in the Plan have been met (including the view that the event corresponds to a one-in-three (or more) year event).
    ii. The pre-assessment is backed by compelling data and evidence captured in the FNS crisis risk reports as well as by relevant qualitative confirmation from affected districts, regions, and/or subnational government(s).
	Lead MOPIED
	
	 Contributing
	 • Technical line ministries (leads for the technical discussion)
	 • Risk Team (SNBS, FSNAU, SWALIM)
	 • FNS programming leads from UN, humanitarian, development, and donor partners
		Day 10

[27] Each member organization of the Programming Team has one vote. Members include: Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation; MOPIED; Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range; Ministry of Fisheries and Blue Economy; SODMA; Ministry of Energy and Water Resources; Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs; Ministry of Health; FSNCC; FAO; WFP; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; UNICEF; NRC/BRCis; World Vision/SomRep; FEWS NET; FCDO; EU; USAID; World Bank.

STEPS	RESPONSIBLE	DUE

3. *cont.* iii. The expected impacts of the emerging conditions threaten to extend well beyond what can be addressed with existing operational capacities (e.g. current programming across the partners adjusted as called for by the situation).
 	
    iv. There is general agreement on the types of interventions that should be prioritized across humanitarian and development partners for further scaling up alongside a well-justified estimate of additional funding needs as identified by the gap analysis.
 	
    • The Programming Team is invited to share any major FNS programming updates and any other related matters.
 	
    • MOPIED summarizes the meeting and agreed next steps and closes the meeting.
 	
Annex 4 sets out an example of how this meeting can be held in under two hours.
	Lead
	MOPIED
	
	Contributing
	• Technical line ministries (leads for the technical discussion)
	• Risk Team (SNBS, FSNAU, SWALIM)
	• FNS programming leads from UN, humanitarian, development, and donor partners
		Day 10

4. MOPIED, in consultation with technical line ministries and the Risk Team, drafts and circulates a short (two-page) summary of the meeting and shares it with the Risk, Programming, and Senior Teams and the Global FNS Dashboard.	**Lead** MOPIED	Day 12

At the conclusion of the meeting, two outcomes may materialize:

Scenario 1: No escalation
If the Programming Team decides not to escalate to the Senior Team, MOPIED, in consultation with technical line ministries and the Risk Team, drafts and circulates a short summary of the meeting and shares it with the Risk, Programming, and Senior Teams. This summary will be published promptly on the Global FNS Dashboard to facilitate transparency and accountability in the decision-making process and to convey to country, regional, and global stakeholders that the Plan process is operational and being properly maintained. This officially ends the triggering cycle.

Scenario 2: Escalation
If the Programming Team finds that an extraordinary FNS crisis could be emerging, MOPIED, in consultation with technical line ministries, develops a crisis preparedness escalation package within 10 business days of the meeting. The development of the escalation package will be led by select focal points appointed across Programming Team members and will include the MOPIED Director-General, one representative from the United Nations (e.g., Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), one representative from the (non-UN) humanitarian community, one representative from the development community, and one representative from the donor community. This package will include: i) a summary outlining the findings of the FNS report and the rationale as to why the Programming Team has escalated to the Senior Team; ii) copies of the FNS crisis risk monitoring report and presentation(s) made by SNBS, FSNAU, SWALIM, and FNS partners; and (iii) proposed recommended adjustments to partner FNS programs to address the crisis, and an indicative estimate of the additional resources needed to make such adjustments. Once the package is developed, MOPIED, on behalf of the Programming Team, sends the Senior Team the escalation package and proposed agenda, requesting a special meeting of the Senior Team within 10 business days.

4c. Senior Team – Operational arrangements for convening and decision-making to trigger the Preparedness Plan

The OPM leads and coordinates the Senior Team, with the Prime Minister serving as the Chair. The Senior Team comprises the most senior country-level representatives across FNS-related government agencies and partners. These officials are responsible for overseeing their agency's overall FNS engagement in Somalia. The head of each institution serves as the primary focal point, and an alternate (deputy) focal point may also be appointed in their absence. The Senior Team also includes the President of the affected FMS(s), where relevant and possible. The Senior Team is primarily responsible for triggering and overseeing the Plan and its outcomes, supporting the Plan's crisis preparedness escalation procedures, and facilitating strong collaborations across FNS partners.

The Senior Team meets within 10 business days of the Programming Team requesting a meeting after an escalation scenario. In exceptional situations, and at the discretion of the OPM, the Senior Team may be convened outside of the Preparedness Plan triggering process as part of an emergency meeting. The purpose of these exceptional meetings is to provide an expedited means for convening senior officials and facilitating discussion should a sudden and extraordinary FNS-related shock occur. The Senior Team can task the Programming Team to prepare a crisis preparedness escalation package following this meeting if warranted and agreed with the Senior Team members. Additionally, in the absence of an escalation scenario, the Senior Team will meet on an annual basis and make use of existing major national and/or international events to discuss the Plan and ensure its operational arrangements are being properly maintained, as appropriate. Figure 4 summarizes the protocols that the Senior Team leads as part of the Preparedness Plan triggering process, which are further detailed in Table 3.

FIGURE 4: SENIOR TEAM PROTOCOLS

OPM shares crisis prep escalation package with Senior Team and calls meeting

OPM convenes preparatory meeting with technical line ministries and Risk Team

Senior Team (convened by OPM) meets with Programming and Risk Teams to discuss and deliberate; Prime Minister makes final decision to trigger

Plan not triggered — Decision summary published

Plan triggered

Plan triggered:
1. Release joint statement
2. Mobilize and track additional financing across all partners
3. Raise global/regional support and attention
4. Monitor emerging crisis and scaled up response
5. De-escalate after crisis

Global/regional support
Dedicated roundtable at global/regional level (supported by IASC, GAFS, GNAFC) to raise awareness and mobilize action at scale across humanitarian and development partners:
1. Informing participants of the situation
2. Facilitating shared understanding and advocacy
3. Understanding national financing
4. Encouraging additional resource mobilization, where possible
5. Aligning action across partners
6. Sharing operational information
7. Agreeing on division of labor

WITHIN 10 BUSINESS DAYS

TABLE 3: SENIOR TEAM PROTOCOLS AS PART OF THE PREPAREDNESS PLAN TRIGGERING PROCESS

STEPS	RESPONSIBLE	DUE
1. Once the crisis preparedness escalation package is received from MOPIED, OPM will circulate it to the Senior Team alongside a calendar invitation with the specified location; a virtual connection will also be made available. The meeting will be scheduled within 10 business days of receiving the package from MOPIED.	**Lead** OPM	Day 0-2
2. OPM convenes a preparatory meeting that includes MOPIED, technical line ministries and the Risk Team (SNBS, FSNAU, SWALIM). Run of show, key discussion topics, and other relevant issues are discussed.	**Lead** OPM **Contributing** MOPIED, technical line ministries/ agencies; Risk Team (SNBS, FSNAU, SWALIM)	Day 5
3. OPM convenes the meeting of the Senior Team. • OPM chairs the meeting. • MOPIED, in coordination with technical line ministries and the Risk Team: i) present the key findings from the updated FNS report(s); ii) detail the rationale for the Programming Team to escalate conditions to the Senior Team; iii) provide an overview of the potential interventions that could be prioritized across partners to scale up responses using existing programs; and iv) outline associated financing gaps and related details. • OPM facilitates discussion among the Senior Team members. The Senior Team is invited to ask clarifying questions. The Senior Team discusses the emerging situation, the proposed operational responses, financing gaps, and other relevant matters. • The Senior Team deliberates and advises the Prime Minister,[28] who decides whether to trigger the Plan based on the evidence and recommendations provided by the Programming and Risk Teams.	**Lead** OPM (Chairs) **Contributing** MOPIED, technical line ministers; Chair of the FSNCC; UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator(s); World Bank Country Manager; Risk Team (SNBS, FSNAU, SWALIM); donor partners	Day 10

At the conclusion of the meeting, two outcomes may materialize:

Scenario 1: Preparedness Plan not triggered
If the Plan is not triggered, MOPIED, in close collaboration with technical line ministries, will develop a short summary (~1 page) reflecting the Senior Team's decision and rationale. This decision will be circulated to the Senior Team and promptly be made publicly available, including as part of the Global FNS Dashboard, to facilitate transparency and accountability in the decision-making process. This officially ends the triggering cycle.

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[28] In an exceptional situation that prevents the government from leading and/or implementing the Plan, responsibility for this decision will temporarily fall to the Office of the United Nations Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General or other suitable high-level international and multistakeholder office in close coordination with the country's FNS partners across the humanitarian, development, and donor communities, until the government can resume its duties.

TABLE 3 cont.

Scenario 2: Preparedness Plan triggered

If the Plan is triggered, the following actions will be undertaken:

1. **Release of a joint statement**: A statement will be released by the Senior Team—drafted by the Permanent Secretary of OPM in coordination with MOPIED and technical line ministries—formally recognizing the emerging and extraordinary conditions and calling on all partners to: adjust existing programs; scale up additional financing, where possible; and mobilize early responses to mitigate the expected impacts. The statement will also indicate the special arrangements that will be put in place to monitor the status of the conditions and response. This joint statement will be published within five business days of the decision to trigger the Plan and will be disseminated widely, including to regional and global counterparts as part of the Global FNS Dashboard.

2. **Mobilization and tracking of additional financing to bolster national responses**: Partners, where possible, will mobilize additional financing, including using available and eligible contingency resources and modalities to bolster national responses. This could include signaling any major changes in programming to address the emerging needs. Additionally, the partners agree to share timely information about new commitments or (re)allocations made in response to the emerging crisis, including using International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) reporting arrangements—such as the use of specialized financial tracking codes—which will be coordinated by the Global FNS Dashboard.

3. **Raising global/regional attention**: The Senior Team, and particularly FGS's international partners, will liaise closely with their regional and global counterparts to raise the profile of the emerging conditions and bolster additional financing and programming, where possible. This will include the participation of OPM and supporting members of the Senior Team in a dedicated roundtable held jointly by GAFS, the Global Network Against Food Crises, and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee at the global/regional level to raise the profile of the emerging needs and seek additional support, where possible.

4. **Monitoring the emerging crisis and scaled-up responses**: The Senior Team will task the Programming Team to monitor conditions and generate short monthly reports. A consolidated monthly report will be shared with the Senior Team, detailing the status of the crisis conditions and the response, including additional resources mobilized across partners. The Senior Team will also meet and be briefed on a quarterly basis.

5. **De-escalation**: These special arrangements will remain in place until official FNS crisis risk monitoring reports indicate that the acute shock no longer poses a significant risk. At such point, the Senior Team will issue a joint statement to mark the end of these special arrangements. The statement will be published publicly and disseminated widely, including as part of the Global FNS Dashboard. The Senior Officials Group will then task the Programming Team with reviewing the performance of the Plan's operational arrangements, highlighting lessons learned and areas of improvement to be integrated into an updated version of the Plan to strengthen operational arrangements and collaboration among FNS partners. This review will also identify opportune points to transition immediate and short-term responses into longer-term resilience-building efforts. The analysis will be provided to the Senior Team within six months of the conclusion of the triggered event.

5 Crisis preparedness planning

This section outlines financing and response modalities that can be explored across government and humanitarian, development, and donor partners when the Plan is triggered, to mobilize a timely and comprehensive response to mitigate emerging crisis conditions, particularly for the most vulnerable populations. It also details general targeting criteria to help guide interventions.

5a. Mobilizing contingency financing to scale up responses to an emerging FNS crisis

To scale up responses when the Plan is triggered, additional ex-ante funding will need to be mobilized across all partners—including FGS, FMS, and humanitarian, development, and donor partners. The ability to provide additional funding, however, varies across partners and institutions and often follows specific budgetary cycles. Funding streams may have caps and/or specific terms that limit how funds can be used, when funds can be accessed, and who can receive funds.

The objective of the Plan is to clarify, amplify, and expand (without replacing or replicating) existing financing modalities. Typically, three options can be explored for mobilizing resources when the Plan is triggered:

1. **Dedicated/special contingency financing facilities/vehicles/instruments/windows**: These resources—typically set aside as a "rainy day" fund—are designed to respond specifically to emerging FNS crises. For some, these set-asides may have FNS crises written into their modus operandi, whereas others may have a more general or global pool of contingency resources that can be drawn upon for various crises (one of which could

be an FNS crisis). Examples of such financing modalities include the FAO Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation,[29] the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund,[30] the World Bank's Crisis Response Window Early Response Financing,[31] and START Network's START Ready.[32,33] These also include, where relevant and available, dedicated disaster risk management instruments, including insurance vehicles such as those provided by the African Risk Capacity. Micro-level contingent financing mechanisms such as Index-Based Livestock Insurance for herders may also be available.

2. **Reallocation of existing funding modalities**: These resources represent financing reallocated or shifted from existing portfolios to respond to an FNS crisis, rather than new or additional funding. Some partners may have discretion or specific modalities (e.g., crisis modifiers) to reallocate funds across their country, and in some cases regional/global portfolios.

3. **New funding modalities**: These resources represent new funding—that is, additional to existing and/or planned funding—mobilized in response to an FNS crisis. For some, mobilizing new funding may require approval by senior administrators, congresses/parliaments, and/or boards. This could also include raising additional funding in the markets (e.g., bond issuances) or via special appeals.

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[29] See https://www.fao.org/policy-support/mechanisms/mechanisms-details/fr/c/448789/
[30] See https://cerf.un.org/
[31] See https://ida.worldbank.org/en/financing/crisis-financing/crisis-response-window
[32] See https://startnetwork.org/funds/start-ready
[33] Pre-positioned funding for crises that happen with regular and predictable patterns of recurrence, such as floods and droughts, based on financing using advanced planning.

FGS and its partners aim to track their respective contingency resources and share information about these resources on a regular basis, including as part of the Global FNS Dashboard. However, integrated financial tracking and aid systems covering all relevant partners (holistic support approach) do not currently exist in Somalia. In the absence of the capacity to live track such financing options in a systematic and integrated manner, the Programming Team will conduct a just-in-time stock-take of financing options that can potentially be drawn upon during an escalation scenario. This information will form part of the development of the crisis preparedness escalation package to be sent to the Senior Team and will adhere to the 10-business-day development schedule for the overall package. Resources mobilized in response to the triggered Plan will be monitored by the Somalia Ministry of Finance (MOF) in collaboration with MOPIED and the Global FNS Dashboard, including through special IATI reporting arrangements (see Box 2).

5b. Scaling responses when the Preparedness Plan is triggered

Developing options for scaling up responses starts with acknowledging government priorities on FNS as articulated in Somalia's Poverty Reduction Strategy, NDP-9 2020–2024, and the Somalia Nutrition Strategy 2020–2025. In addition to reducing food insecurity and malnutrition, especially among the most vulnerable groups, such as pregnant women and children under five years, these key priorities include

improving government capacity for disaster risk management, starting with early warning systems.

The response needed to prevent or mitigate the expected impacts of an emerging food and nutrition security crisis will depend on the specific acute shock(s) affecting Somalia at the time the Plan is triggered. Responses will also be determined by the type of emerging risks, the programming that is in place or can rapidly be established, the capacity of the implementing agencies to scale up and reach the affected areas, and the availability of additional resources.

Similar to the challenge of tracking available financing options, the ability to regularly take stock of FNS-related programming across FGS, FMS, humanitarian, development, and donor partners is exceedingly challenging and is currently not done in Somalia. There are several reasons for this. Existing reporting systems may be limited or not sufficiently up to date, and significant logistical challenges are associated with consolidating information across partners who use varying reporting standards and systems. To date, the Plan has relied on a manual approach to request and collate information for individual institutions across FNS partners; however, it has proved challenging to receive robust, comprehensive, and timely responses. Annex 2 outlines key considerations for developing FGS's capacity to track FNS-related programming. The Global FNS Dashboard supports this type of tracking, and the Plan will make use of these arrangements.

BOX 2: SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL AID TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (IATI) FINANCIAL TRACKING ARRANGEMENTS

When the Preparedness Plan is triggered, it is critical that financing mobilized across partners be monitored closely to ensure financing gaps are being addressed in a timely manner and that the FGS and its partners understand the real-time status of the response.

To better enable the timely reporting of this financing across all partners, special IATI reporting codes will be used. Organizations that publish data using the IATI data standard can include a specific "tag" that will help partners find and use that data. For the Somalia Preparedness Plan, organizations can do this by adding the tag #PPFNS-SO to their IATI data in any of the relevant data fields—activity title; activity description; description of any relevant transaction—or in the specific tag field of the IATI standard, if the organization uses that.

For further help and guidance, the IATI Support Team can be reached at support@iatistandard.org.

For the time being, the Plan seeks to identify overarching strategic responses that can be scaled up across FGS and its FNS partners. Should the Plan be triggered, the Programming Team may consider these operational response categories for scaling up. The crisis preparedness escalation package will elaborate on the specific programs and projects that would be used by the contributing partners.

- **Food security interventions**—operational responses to improve the availability of food for people facing severe acute food insecurity and to protect rural livelihoods and related sources of food and income.

- **Nutrition interventions**—operational responses to strengthen the prevention of acute malnutrition among vulnerable groups, especially children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women.

- **Safety net and adaptable social protection interventions**—operational responses to enhance access to food, such as cash transfers and cash for work.

- **Water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions**—operational responses to provide emergency water, sanitation, and hygiene services to prevent waterborne diseases and related risks.

Efforts to save livelihood assets are critical to increasing affected communities' resilience, particularly to weather future shocks. Ensuring responses deliver multidimensional and cross-sectoral solutions is also critical. This could include controlling outbreaks of vector-borne animal diseases while improving the household resilience of farmers affected by major flooding.

FGS and its partners aim to pre-emptively identify options in their FNS programming portfolios that can be scaled up if the Plan is formally triggered and an emerging and extraordinary crisis is anticipated. For instance, the humanitarian system could draw from its annual Humanitarian Response Plan to pre-identify activities that might be suitable for scaling up based on their impact and how quickly they can be deployed. Similarly, development and peace partners with active FNS projects can pre-identify which activities are most relevant within their respective strategic planning frameworks. Such pre-identification

should coincide with existing planning cycles and ideally be undertaken annually and around the same time, with results consolidated by MOPIED.

If there is no capacity to live track such programming options in a systematic and integrated manner, the Programming Team will conduct a just-in-time stock-take of programming options that could be scaled up during an escalation scenario. This information will form part of the crisis preparedness escalation package to be sent to the Senior Team and will adhere to the 10-business-day development schedule for the overall package. During the stocktaking exercise, each Programming Team partner will identify the potential activities to be scaled up and the level of scaling up (e.g., 10 percent), the operational implications of scaling up (e.g., capacity of existing partners to increase the operational scale), and additional financing required, among other considerations.

5c. General targeting criteria

The general targeting criteria, guided by the FNS priorities of the FGS, seek to ensure that the people most in need within the crisis-affected population are prioritized for support. The realities on the ground and the speed at which a crisis may be unfolding make it difficult to conduct a comprehensive needs assessment without sacrificing the window of opportunity to catalyze early action. Furthermore, Somalia's many FNS partners already use comprehensive targeting criteria to deliver their assistance, which can also help expedite this step. The Programming Team will identify specific activities to be scaled up based on their existing geographic coverage and beneficiary population when the Plan is triggered and will detail how their programming can be expanded to reach additional crisis-affected districts and/or populations, as needed. It is expected that all activities supported by FNS partners adhere to general targeting principles, namely:

1. **Geographic targeting**: Responses will focus on key geographic locations/livelihood zones where there is a high concentration of needs and/or hazards, as highlighted by the FNS risk reporting; and

2. **Categorical targeting**: Responses will ensure that the most vulnerable groups—in particular, IDPs, pregnant and lactating women, single heads of households, the elderly, young children, and poor households—are reached. Able-bodied members of the community will be supported through mitigating activities such as labor-intensive public works aimed at increasing resilience to shocks and improving FNS. Special attention is needed to address food insecurity in conflict-affected areas and should be delivered in ways that strengthen resilience.

The principle of Do No Harm will be strictly observed to ensure that beneficiaries are protected from violence, exploitation, and abuse; there is non-discrimination, transparency, and accountability in decision-making; and the response is inclusive. Monitoring of scaled-up activities by OPM and MOPIED will include verification of the adherence to Do No Harm by government, implementing agencies, and FNS partners in their programs.

Programming Team members will collectively identify activities to be scaled up across geographic areas and populations affected by the emerging crisis and will then maximize coverage of assistance through coordinated responses while minimizing the risk of inclusion and exclusion errors.[34] The Programming Team is responsible for ensuring that the operational responses put forward in the crisis preparedness escalation package sent to the Senior Team adhere to these guidelines.

6 Preparedness Plan operational status and maintenance

The Plan has been formally endorsed by the Federal Government of Somalia and is considered fully operational as of January 1, 2024. The Plan has been shared with FNS partners leading programmatic responses in the country and has been endorsed by OPM, MOPIED, MOF, MOAI, MOEWR, MOECC, MOFBE, MOH, MOISA, MOLFR, SODMA, SNBS, and FSNCC and their FMS counterparts, where applicable. MOPIED serves as the primary lead of the Plan under the supervision of the OPM. Questions concerning the Plan should be directed to Abdi Adan Tawane (tawane.scrp@gmail.com).

The Plan is authorized for public dissemination and can be found on the Global FNS Dashboard.[35] The Plan will be updated with pertinent changes on an ongoing basis and will be reviewed once per year by the Programming Team. A more comprehensive evaluation of the Plan's performance and efficacy in meeting its stated objectives will be conducted every three years.

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34 Food Security Cluster. 2021. "Yemen Food Security and Agriculture Cluster Vulnerability and Targeting Guidance Note." https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/fsac_vulnerability_targeting_guidance_final_june_2021.pdf.
35 See https://www.gafs.info/home/

Overview of Somalia's FNS crisis risks and drivers, and lessons learned

T his annex details major factors and acute shocks (including based on historical analysis) affecting food availability, food access, food stability, and food utilization that can lead to an extraordinary FNS crisis in Somalia.

1. Drivers of food and nutrition insecurity

The main drivers of food and nutrition insecurity in Somalia in 2023 were:

- Climate change, resulting in more frequent and severe droughts and flooding, which disrupted pastoral and agropastoral livelihoods and increased the country's vulnerability to shocks, as agriculture accounts for 60–70 percent of its GDP. The impact of climate change is felt through failed crops and a shortage of water for human and livestock consumption, while flooding disrupts rural productive activities and livelihoods and causes water- and vector-bone diseases.

- A high dependence on food imports, thus exposing households to volatile global food prices, especially among the poorest households. Due to the low productive capacity of its agriculture, Somalia has a chronic food crop deficit. Local production[36] meets only 22 percent of per capita cereal needs on average, rising to about 40–50 percent of per capita cereal needs in exceptional years of high agricultural production. Consequently, the country imports most basic staples, including wheat and wheat products, powdered milk, cooking oils, and sugar.

- Conflict, alongside climate impact, often causing largescale displacements of the population. In the context of widespread structural poverty, such displacements result in high vulnerability to FNS shocks.

Most displaced people typically settle in IDP camps, where they become dependent on humanitarian assistance.

2. Historical incidents and impact

Since 1990 and the fall of the central government, Somalia has been plagued by interclan conflict and, for the last decade and a half, by terrorist insurgency and weak governance, while experiencing the impacts of a changing climate. Over the same period, famine or near famine has been declared on at least four occasions (1992, 2011, 2016–18, and 2022–23).[37]

The first FNS crisis occurred in 1992, when a regional drought and the ongoing civil war resulted in widespread famine. This famine led to multiple international government and nongovernmental aid agencies getting involved in the relief effort for Somalia. The next major crisis, in July 2011, resulted in the UN declaring a famine in southern Somalia, which affected 3.1 million people. This crisis was caused by multiple factors, including drought, conflict, rapidly rising global food prices, and structural factors related to the high levels of poverty and vulnerability among the affected population.[38] Access to affected populations was restricted by the Al-Shabaab militants, who controlled the southern regions. Despite early warnings pointing to an impending humanitarian disaster, there were no major food aid agencies in the country and humanitarian programs lacked an adequate contingency plan.

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36 See https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/781281522164647812/volume-1-main-report
37 In "Famine systems: A new model for understanding the development of famines", Howe (2018) defines famine as an event, process, or combination of both.
See https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X17304217. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC, 2021) Technical Manual Version 3.1 defines famine using its accepted criteria: 20 percent of households in an area are experiencing famine; more than 30 percent are experiencing acute malnutrition; and a crude death rate greater than 2/10,000/day or less than five death rates above 4/10,000/day. See https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/manual/IPC_Technical_Manual_3_Final.pdf
38 See Maxwell and Fitzpatrick. 2012. "The 2011 Somalia famine: Context, causes, and complications." https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S221191241200003X

Drought caused another severe period of food insecurity between 2015 and 2017. More than 1.7 million people were impacted, with pastoral households losing 60 percent of all livestock.[39] Most recently, Somalia was on the verge of having a famine declared in 2023. ReliefWeb (2023) reports that since January 2023, 720,000 people have been displaced by flood and drought, moving to Hiraan in central Somalia and Gedo in southern Somalia.[40] Ongoing armed conflict and insecurities in parts of the country are also causing large-scale rural displacement. The UN Refugee Agency (2023) reports there are some 3.8 million IDPs in Somalia and that at least 6.7 million of the population struggle to feed themselves.

These crises have caused extensive and ongoing damage to the Somali economy. Livelihoods have been weakened over time, resulting in widespread poverty and vulnerability at household level. World Bank (2023) estimates[41] indicate extreme poverty, with 73.4 percent of the population living below the international poverty rate ($2.15 in 2017 purchasing power parity). Most of the population is food insecure and consequently transitions from one crisis to another. In addition, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2022)[42] reports that drought has directly led to the disruption of education for 2.4 million school-aged children, with another 1.7 million not attending school.

The country now relies heavily on food imports. Before the war in Ukraine, much of the wheat imported into Somalia came from Ukraine and the Russian Federation. The war caused both loss of supply and price increases, resulting in record costs for staple food items in many of the most drought-affected areas in Somalia. Another challenge households face is relying on external remittances from Somalia's diaspora.[43] This leaves households exposed to global economic downturns (which affect the remittance inflows) and the volatility of global commodity food prices.

Furthermore, Somalia has experienced a surge in food demand since 1990, driven by population growth and rapid urbanization.

Somalia is already more urbanized that other countries in East Africa, having an estimated 46 percent of urban dwellers. The increasing trend for more of the population to live in urban areas puts more pressure on food supply given the increasing dependence on food imports. Predictions indicate that the rate of growth will continue such that by 2030 almost 4 million more people will reside in urban areas than today.

3. Lessons and outlook

The outlook in terms of food insecurity and associated emergencies and famine for Somalia can be improved if lessons from earlier crises are acted upon. The lessons learned are:

1. **Limited cooperation between government and FNS partners on data-gathering and related analytics, and on achieving consensus on IPC classifications**:[44] Responses triggered by past IPC analyses, which involve little technical involvement of and oversight by FGS, tend to be weakly coordinated. Better coordination is needed to ensure government involvement and to mobilize predictable support at national, regional, and global levels. Divergence between UN agencies and FGS on the need to project the occurrence of famine in 2022, for example, demonstrates the need for greater partnership and coordination in collecting and analyzing data and generating a response to emerging conditions.

2. **Technical limitations and lags on data points**: There are significant uncertainties about the accuracy of the FSNAU data on local food production—and therefore on seasonal trends in food prices—and the timing and scale of the humanitarian response, which together limit the accuracy of IPC-based early warnings. As highlighted by the recent Somalia Famine Review,[45] the projection of famine made by the IPC analysis of post-Gu 2022 was far off the mark. The projection assumed upward price trends and inadequate levels of planned and funded assistance. This scenario did

39 See Federal Govt of Somalia. 2018. "Drought impact and needs assessment and resilient recovery framework." https://www.gfdrr.org/en/somalia-drought-impact-and-needs-assessment-and-resilient-recovery-framework
40 See https://reliefweb.int/updates?advanced-search=%28PC216%29_%2F10%29&search=UNHCR
41 See https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099020624191514245/pdf/BOSIB1970b1e670f519f6a1fe1f557e94a0.pdf
42 See https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-drought-crisis-education-snapshot-july-2022
43 See Vargas-Silva. 2016. "Literature review: Remittances sent to and from refugees and internally displaced persons." https://www.knomad.org/sites/default/files/2017-04/KNOMAD%20WP%2012%20Lit%20Review%20Remittances%20tofrom%20Refugees%20and%20IDPs.pdf
44 See https://odi.org/en/publications/independent-review-of-the-ipc-in-somalia/
45 See https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Famine_Review_Report_Somalia_Dec2022.pdf

not materialize, because the humanitarian response had been scaled up beyond the levels anticipated, and prices quickly stabilized for food commodities after heavier-than-predicted Deyr rains. Furthermore, the late declaration of famine in 2011 highlighted that many indicators used in IPC analyses are lagging in nature[46] and should be bolstered by more leading indicators for mobilizing anticipatory and earlier action.

3. **IPC technical constraints related to missing data, data quality, the timing of data collection, and the limited ability to use qualitative data:** The IPC system is unclear on how to deal with the magnitude or length of a crisis in a consistent way. These limitations are being addressed but require more work. There are also inadequacies in the IPC's sampling approach to collecting data for crop and livestock production, resulting in data that are not always statistically robust. Furthermore, the IPC's methodology for analyzing and interpreting data and related outputs may, at times, lack transparency and are largely based on normative judgements.

4. **Political constraints that influence the "technical consensus" that defines the phase classification of food insecurity**: Unlike other countries, IPC Somalia has no functioning Technical Working Group—an important arrangement within IPC protocols for facilitating quality analysis—leading to widespread perceptions of its lack of transparency and accountability. Indeed, the FAO has voiced concerns about the continued relevance of the IPC in a world in which decisions need to be made more rapidly. The FAO has also drawn attention to the issue of governance and management, recurring themes in terms of the development of the IPC at global, regional, and country levels. Specifically, the FAO notes that the IPC needs to align its governance structure with how organizations in the humanitarian sector operate, with an explicit commitment to localization and decolonization.

5. **Strengthening government systems**: It is recognized that a statistical analysis using FSNAU dashboard data is needed to get more reliable predictors of an emerging crisis within a timeframe shorter than the current biannual FSNAU post-Gu and -Deyr projections. This statistical analysis can be built on a modelling approach that uses historic IPC classifications, and it can then be used to improve the IPC analysis and generate alternative indicators that can potentially be linked to IPC predictions and be used as a validation tool.

The Plan seeks to address these lessons by:

1. **Improving government leadership and systems**: Government leading the Preparedness Plan process and improving its systems of data collection in collaboration with other partners will help ensure that unambiguous evidence of food and nutrition insecurity is produced. Given the limitations of the IPC identified above, Preparedness Plan modelling can be part of an ongoing international effort to improve the early warning system. A growing body of research focuses on the use of forward-looking or forecast indicators.

2. **Improved complementarity and transparency of local FNS programming**: More coordination is required for effective delivery of humanitarian assistance—specifically, how it is distributed and who is identified as requiring help when scaling up activities after the Preparedness Plan has been triggered.

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46   See Maxwell, Khalif, Hailey, and Checchi. (2020). "Viewpoint: Determining famine: Multi-dimensional analysis for the twenty-first century."
     https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2020.101832

3. **Anticipation and preparedness**: Policies and government responses need to change from being reactive to being anticipatory to reduce people's vulnerability to shocks and to strengthen food and nutrition security. This requires the development of an anticipatory approach while focusing on building greater resilience in the country's food system. The emphasis needs to be on developing a better evidence base that can yield information in a timely and effective manner. Using the above-described quantitative data-driven approach to improve understanding of past food crises and forecast future crises would support the design of effective, context-specific preventive actions that would address some of the root causes of food insecurity.

4. **Efficiency of response**: More robust predictive models must be explored to improve the country's early warning systems for FNS. The use of statistical models that can provide transparent and reproducible forecasts of food and nutrition security conditions have improved significantly in recent years and are primed for mainstream use.[47]

47 See Andrée, Chamorro, Kraay, Spencer, and Wang, 2020, "Predicting food crises", at https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/304451600783424495/predicting-food-crises; Wang, Andrée, Chamorro, and Spencer, 2020, "Stochastic modeling of food insecurity", at https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/911801600788869914/stochastic-modeling-of-food-insecurity; and Penson, Lomme, Carmichael, Manni, Shrestha, Andrée. 2024. "A Data-Driven Approach for Early Detection of Food Insecurity in Yemen's Humanitarian Crisis", at https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099709505092462162/idu1fd335ca917518148461a5b1154ba368027ff

Forward-looking and aspirational efforts to strengthen government capacity to lead and deliver the Preparedness Plan

This annex captures planned efforts to build FGS' capacity to lead and deliver the Preparedness Plan. While the core Plan document represents active operational arrangements, efforts captured in this annex are not yet in place and/or require additional time to become operational. These aspirational efforts are timebound and specific, and the progress made in achieving these targets will be included in the annual performance reviews submitted to the Senior Team.

TABLE 4: FORWARD-LOOKING AND ASPIRATIONAL EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN GOVERNMENT CAPACITY TO LEAD AND DELIVER THE PREPAREDNESS PLAN

CAPACITY-BUILDING GOAL	DESCRIPTION	RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES	ACTION STEPS AND TIMELINE
Enhanced capacity to lead the Risk Team's operational arrangements for monitoring, reporting, and identifying extraordinary FNS crises in Somalia			
Training for SNBS to support better use of WFP food price data to facilitate effective implementation of the Plan in the short term.	WFP currently collects food prices weekly across 38 locations in Somalia, and plans to expand this to a total of 65 locations in the future. SNBS can use these data to both supplement its current food price inflation estimates from the consumer price index (CPI) and conduct its own FNS assessment to better support the implementation of the Plan.	SNBS, as supported by WFP	Mobilization of resources for SNBS staff training in vulnerability analysis and mapping data analysis and reporting to ensure that price data are ready to be used for June 2024 reporting.
Financial and technical support in the medium term for SNBS to improve price data collection and analysis by moving away from the current CPI estimates, which are based only on Mogadishu, to a nationally representative CPI by collecting price data in at least one or two of the most populated FMS centers/districts in each accessible region.	Current SNBS price inflation estimates based on data collected in Mogadishu are insufficient to support Plan implementation nationwide in the longer run, as they contain no information at FMS level.	SNBS, as supported by FMS statistical units	High-level leadership action and financial support are necessary to address the current CPI funding gaps and existing FGS-FMS coordination challenges to enable SNBS to collect price data across the regions. A new Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose (COICOP) form that can be loaded on an online platform for completion,

CAPACITY-BUILDING GOAL	DESCRIPTION	RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES	ACTION STEPS AND TIMELINE
cont...			a cloud-based server for data storage, and trained staff are already readily available to SNBS. Timeframe for this activity by June 2024.
Train SNBS and build capacity to conduct FNS crisis risk monitoring currently led by FSNAU and SWALIM.	Most major FNS analysis is provided by FSNAU and SWALIM, two FAO-managed and donor-supported agencies that are in the process of being fully transferred to the FGS (FSNAU to SNBS and SWALIM to MOECC, based on a memorandum of understanding signed in September 2021 between the FAO and MOPIED and based on subsequent directives issued by OPM).	SNBS, MOECC, FSNAU, SWALIM	December 2024
Enhanced capacity to lead the Programming Team's operational arrangements for convening and decision-making			
Technical support for establishment of a dedicated Plan coordination desk in government to ensure regular stocktaking is done of FNS crisis contingency financing and programming across all partners.	Develop process for updating stocktaking of FNS crisis contingency financing and programming to ensure that FNS projects falling within the scope of scaling up after the Plan is triggered in a particular year are captured accurately. This can be facilitated by using the forthcoming Global FNS Dashboard module, including by provisioning government and its FNS partners to input their relevant financing and programming on a regular basis and corresponding with existing planning cycles (e.g., annually).	MOPIED	MOPIED to allocate staff member and office space for the desk. Plan Coordination Team to be trained to use the Global FNS Dashboard, draft the protocol and provide training on its implementation. Timeframe for completion of this activity is December 2024.
Putting in place effective contingency financing mechanism for FGS to enable early response.	FGS to develop a strategy for developing pre-determined, earmarked contingent funding for early FNS crisis response funding linked to the triggering of the Plan.	MOPIED	Convene a high-level meeting with Somalia donor group by December 2024.

CAPACITY-BUILDING GOAL	DESCRIPTION	RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES	ACTION STEPS AND TIMELINE
Technical support for lead technical ministry/agency in assessing FNS crisis risk data and evidence and providing recommendations.	Technical leadership requires specific set of analytical skills in scrutinizing evidence on emerging crisis and providing recommendations for action at Programming Team.	OPM, MOPIED, MOF, MOAI, MOEWR, MOECC, MOFBE, MOH, MOLSA, MOLFR, SODMA, SNBS, FSNCC	Technical assistance to be provided to the technical lead ministries, including from FSNAU and SWALIM, to build necessary capacity by December 2024.
Enhanced capacity to lead the Senior Team's operational arrangements for convening and decision-making to trigger the Preparedness Plan			
Technical and financial support to enable the capacity of the secretariat for the FSNCC, which is responsible for operational arrangements for scaling up activities, including monitoring an emerging crisis and scaled up response.	Operational delivery and oversight of the scaled-up activities requires a dedicated and accountable team with clear role and responsibilities to ensure effective early responses, communication, and monitoring of the scaled-up activities.	OPM	Selection and appointment of the FSNCC working group by December 2024.

TABLE 5: JMR FOOD SECURITY INDICATORS AND STATISTICAL THRESHOLDS

FNS DIMENSION	RISK INDICATOR	TIMELINESS	DATE FROM	DATA SOURCE	THRESHOLD EXAMPLE	QUANTITATIVE THRESHOLDS		
						TYPICAL LEVEL	HEIGHTENED LEVEL	CRITICAL LEVEL
Food stability	Displacement	Monthly	4/30/2016	UNHCR	Exponential moving average of population % displaced due to drought over last 5 months	< 0.1%	0.1%–0.7%	> 0.7%
Food availability	Drought (NDVI)	Monthly	7/1/2002	WFP	NDVI Z-score aggregated over 12 months	> -0.58	1.24	< -0.66
Food availability	Drought (CDI)	Monthly	1/1/2002	SWALIM	Combined Drought Index (CDI) over 1 month	> 0.70	0.47–0.70	< 0.47
Food access	Food price	Monthly	1/1/2007	FSNAU	Percentual increase of 48-month moving average of top five food items (sugar, red sorghum, camel milk, white maize, and wheat flour)	< 10%	10%–20%	> 20%
Food access	Fuel price	Monthly	1/1/2007	FSNAU	Percentual increase over 52-month exponential moving average of top four fuel items (diesel, petrol, kerosene and firewood)	< 4%	4%–12%	> 12%
Food access	Water price	Monthly	1/1/2007	FSNAU	Percentual increase over 46-month moving average of the weighted average of 20 L jerricans and 200 L drums	< 12%	12%–34%	> 34%

TABLE 6: SELECT JMR QUALITATIVE INDICATORS

FNS DIMENSION	RISK INDICATOR	TIMELINESS	DATE FROM	DATA SOURCE
Target variable				
Target variable	IPC	6-monthly	1/1/2017	IPC
Target variable	FEWS NET IPC	4-monthly	7/1/2009	FEWS NET
Indicators for qualitative review				
Food availability	Humanitarian food aid/funding	Monthly	1/1/2000	FTS
Food availability	Food imports	Monthly	–	–
Food availability	Fuel imports	Monthly	–	–
Food availability	Flooding (rainfall)	Weekly	1/1/1981	WFP
Food access	International wheat price	Weekly	8/1/2016	ACAPS YETI/ Business Insider
Food stability	Conflict	Monthly	2/15/1997	ACLED
Food access	Remittances	–	–	–
Food utilisation	Acute watery diarrhoea/cholera	Monthly	–	MOH/WHO
Food access	Wage labour	–	–	–
Food utilisation	Acute watery diarrhoea/cholera	Monthly	–	MOH/WHO
Food access	Wage labour	–	–	–
Food access	Household income	–	–	–
Food availability	Global shocks	Monthly	n/a	Qual. analysis
Food availability	Exchange rate	Monthly	1/15/2012	WFP
Nutrition outcome indicators				
Food utilisation	Moderate acute malnutrition admission	Monthly	8/1/2022	FSNAU
Food utilisation	Severe acute malnutrition admission	Monthly	8/1/2022	FSNAU
Food utilisation	Global acute malnutrition admission	Monthly	8/1/2022	FSNAU

**TABLE 6** cont: SELECT JMR QUALITATIVE INDICATORS

FNS DIMENSION	RISK INDICATOR	TIMELINESS	DATE FROM	DATA SOURCE
Food security outcome indicators				
–	Reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI)	Monthly	–	FSNAU
–	Food Consumption Score (FCS)	Monthly	–	FSNAU
Other indicators				
Food availability	Drought (SPI)		1/1/1981	WFP
Food availability	Precipitation Drought Index (PDI)		1/1/2002	SWALIM
Food availability	Temperature Drought Index (TDI)		1/1/2002	SWALIM
Food availability	Rainfall estimates (RFE)		1/1/2002	SWALIM
Food availability	Domestic production		–	–
Food availability	Number of beneficiaries		–	–
Food availability	Locusts		–	–
Food availability	Cyclones		–	–

Example of meeting flow for Programming and Risk Teams

Below is a template for structuring a meeting between the Programming and Risk Teams as part of the Preparedness Plan's triggering cycle. Time per agenda item is estimated for a meeting of two hours. The template indicates who should lead each topic of discussion, allocates time per agenda item, and proposes an order of priority for contributions from participants. It can be adapted as needed.

DURATION	SEGMENT OVERVIEW	DETAILED FLOW FOR SPEAKERS
10 mins	MOPIED opens meeting and conducts roll call.	1. MOPIED Director-General greets participants, conducts roll call, and introduces SNBS Director-General to lead the presentation by the Risk Team.

10–20 mins	Risk Team (SNBS, FSNAU, SWALIM) presents findings from the new FNS risk report, as well as reflections and rationale for the pre-assessment outcome.	2. SNBS Director-General provides opening remarks and introduces the Risk Team to provide an overview of the new report's findings.
		 3. Risk Team presents in the following order:
		   a. SNBS
		   b. FSNAU Chief Technical Officer
		   c. SWALIM Technical Adviser
		 4. SNBS Director-General concludes with an overview of the final pre-assessment and turns the floor back to MOPIED Director-General to lead the Q&A and discussion among participants.

30 mins	The Programming Team is invited to ask the Risk Team questions about the updated risk report and to engage in discussion—to be led by Somalia technical line ministries—on current and projected FNS crisis risks.	5. MOPIED Director-General opens the floor for comments from participants and for questions to be directed to the Risk Team for clarification. Questions will be taken in the following order:
		   a. Government, including lead technical agencies
		   b. Donors and development partners
		   c. UN agencies
		   d. Humanitarian partners
		 6. MOPIED Director-General calls on government lead technical agencies and the Risk Team to help field questions and responses.

DURATION	SEGMENT OVERVIEW	DETAILED FLOW FOR SPEAKERS
15 mins	The Programming Team decides whether to confirm or amend the pre-assessment in accordance with the Preparedness Plan protocols, which require a super-majority (two-thirds) vote across institutions.	7. Once the Q&A period with the Risk Team has concluded, the MOPIED Director-General facilitates voting to confirm the pre-assessment. Two outcomes are possible: the Programming Team can vote to escalate (alerting the Senior Team to a possible emerging extraordinary FNS crisis) or not to escalate. Table 2 sets out the actions to be followed for each outcome.
30 mins	The Programming Team is invited to share any major FNS programming updates and other matters pertinent to the Team.	8. After the vote is finalized, the MOPIED Director-General opens the floor for partners to share any major FNS programming updates or other related matters.
		9. This is an opportunity to share information about what is on the horizon, to discuss major issues important for the group, and to propose issues the Programming Team should discuss and/or follow up on for subsequent meetings.
5–10 mins	MOPIED summarizes the meeting and agreed next steps and closes the meeting.	10. After discussion, the MOPIED Director-General summarizes the main takeaways and next steps. MOPIED Director-General informs the participants that a short summary of the meeting will be drafted and shared with the Risk, Programming, and Senior Teams.